Not Immune: Exploring liability of authoritarian regimes for the COVID-19 pandemic and its cover-up

July 2020
By Sarah Teich

Foreword

by David Matas

This report, Not Immune: Exploring liability of authoritarian regimes for the COVID-19 pandemic and its cover-up by Sarah Teich, is a thorough canvassing of the subject matter which the title describes. For anyone who wants to find out what remedies there are, what can be done, this report has answers, lots of them.

Ms. Teich notes that legal liability is less about blame and more about responsibility and compensation. When we are still in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the primary focus is prevention. Legal liability is a form of prevention. With any wrongdoing, the sooner those responsible are held responsible, the greater the deterrent and prevention effect.

Immunity is a licence for repetition. Indeed, the cover-up, denial and fabrication that we saw in Wuhan, Hubei, with the start of COVID-19 is the consequence of the effective immunity of the Chinese Communist Party and Government when it engaged in similar behaviour with the start of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Guangzhou, Guangdong.

There are some situations where liability and prevention may not go hand in hand. The International Air Transport Association (IATA), for instance, has taken the position that the effort to attribute blame for airplane crashes threatens the free reporting of information about what went wrong.

However, that is not a legitimate concern with COVID-19, because cover-up is not a secondary problem here. Cover-up itself is what went wrong; coverup has been a primary cause of global spread.

As well, sometimes liability is avoided in fragile transition situations. If China or Iran, for instance, were transitioning to democracy and attributing liability to the existing regimes for COVID-19 might undermine that transition, there might be an argument for not attributing liability to present actors in those states. However, that also is not the situation here.

In any case, we do not face a choice between liability determination and no liability determination. The choice is rather structured liability determination and vigilante liability determination. Without structured liability determination, there are those who will take the issue of liability into their own hands, in an indiscriminate and unfair way. Structured liability determination is the best way of fending off this vigilantism.

The advantage of the analysis Sarah Teich brings to the issue is that it is exactly that; it is structured, organized, balanced, and comprehensive. The report speaks for itself as a stand against blame shifting. The aim of the report is not to direct liability attention to just one actor or set of actors. It looks at justice systems as they should always be considered, with no one above the law and everyone equal before the law.

COVID-19 has brought many changes to our world, some beneficial, most not so much. One change the virus should not bring, a point this report makes just by having been written, is that justice, accountability, responsibility and liability should remain. The report is a useful, important reminder of the value and significance of justice in even the most dramatic, widespread, sweeping calamity.

David Matas is an international human rights lawyer based in Winnipeg, Manitoba and a Senior Fellow at the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights.

Executive Summary

China and Iran have both come under criticism for their regimes’ handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and the massive resulting global harm caused by cover-up and obfuscation when responsible action could have contained the virus.

A number of voices have proposed that these regimes should be held legally (and financially) liable for the spread of COVID-19 around the globe.

In an April report by the Henry Jackson Society, researchers found that measures taken to that point by the G7 countries alone amounted to US$4 trillion – and that was before many of these countries announced additional measures. The report proposed that action be taken to seek compensation for that amount from the Chinese regime.

Although this situation is still developing, there is compelling evidence that both Chinese and Iranian regimes buried evidence of the pandemic in its critical early days, choosing to attempt to maintain power and/or stability at the cost of the health and safety of their own citizens and the global population. They are accused of intentionally underreporting data, concealing the extent of the outbreak from the international community and from their own citizenry, and silencing whistleblowers at the expense of protecting public health.

These allegations are serious. According to the University of Southampton, if interventions had been conducted three weeks earlier, cases could have been reduced by 95 percent – significantly reducing global spread of COVID-19.

This paper makes the case that governments (and in some cases, citizens) have a variety legal avenues that could, and should, be pursued in order to seek accountability from China and Iran for the global spread of COVID-19.

This is less about blame, and more about responsibility. It is also about compensation: who should pay for COVID-19?

As this report shows, the Chinese and Iranian regimes likely breached their international legal obligations in a number of key international agreements, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations (IHR), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Biological Weapons Convention. For these agreements, possible avenues for accountability include the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Director-General of the WHO, International Criminal Court, and the UN Security Council, respectively.

No matter the breach, there is also always the potential for utilizing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In China’s case, the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution mechanism may also be utilized to seek accountability for COVID-19. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) may similarly be used.

Accountability could also be sought in Canadian and US domestic legal systems. Options include: suing China or Iran in domestic courts; seeking accountability from Chinese and Iranian corporations in Canada using the Canadian Quarantine Act; imposing economic sanctions on China and Iran using the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) in Canada and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in the US; sanctioning officials under the Magnitsky Acts; and passing novel legislation to specifically address liability for COVID-19.

A final possible avenue is to hold Chinese officials liable for the spread of COVID-19 from within the domestic Chinese legal system. Chinese actions constitute a breach of China’s own laws, and Chinese officials may be in breach of both the Frontier Health and Quarantine Law of the People’s Republic of China (China’s Quarantine Act) and the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (China’s Criminal Code).

In sum, this report expounds on relevant international and domestic laws, and evaluates a variety of avenues of recourse that may be utilized to seek accountability from the Chinese and Iranian regimes. These may be pursued separately, or in tandem, to pressure Chinese and Iranian regimes and work to hold them liable for the trillions of dollars of damages caused by COVID-19.

Sommaire

La Chine et l’Iran ont tous les deux fait l’objet de nombreuses critiques pour la manière dont leurs systèmes nationaux ont géré la pandémie de COVID-19 et les énormes dégâts causés à l’échelle mondiale par les tactiques de camouflage et d’occultation employées, alors que des gestes responsables auraient permis de contenir le virus.

Certaines voix ont proposé que ces régimes soient tenus légalement (et financièrement) responsables de la propagation de la COVID19 à travers le monde.

Dans un rapport publié en avril par la Henry Jackson Society, des chercheurs ont estimé que les mesures prises par les pays du G7 pour lutter contre le virus jusqu’à cette date avaient coûté à elles seules 4 000 milliards de dollars et ce, avant que plusieurs d’entre eux n’annoncent des mesures supplémentaires. Le rapport propose la mise en œuvre d’actions correctives visant à obtenir du régime chinois une indemnité correspondant à cette somme.

Bien que la situation continue d’évoluer, des faits avérés démontrent que la Chine comme l’Iran ont camouflé la situation véritable au cours des premiers jours critiques de la pandémie, ayant choisi de préserver leur pouvoir et leur stabilité au prix de la santé et de la sécurité de leurs propres citoyens et de la population mondiale. Ces régimes sont accusés d’avoir intentionnellement sous-déclaré les données, caché l’étendue de l’éclosion à la communauté internationale et à leurs propres citoyens et fait taire les lanceurs d’alerte au détriment de la protection de la santé publique.

Ces allégations sont graves. Selon l’université de Southampton, si des mesures d’interventions avaient été mises en œuvre trois semaines plus tôt, le nombre de cas d’infection aurait été réduit de 95 p. cent ce qui aurait considérablement limité la propagation de la COVID19 à travers le monde.

Le présent rapport démontre que les gouvernements (et parfois les citoyens) pourraient et devraient recourir à divers moyens légaux pour que la Chine et l’Iran aient à répondre de leurs actes en matière de propagation de la COVID19 dans le monde.

Il n’est pas ici tellement question de blâme, mais plutôt de responsabilité. Par cela, on entend la nécessité d’une indemnisation : qui paiera pour la COVID19?

Comme le montre ce rapport, les régimes chinois et iranien ont vraisemblablement manqué à leurs obligations légales à l’échelle internationale à l’égard d’un certain nombre d’accords internationaux clés, notamment le Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels PIDESC (ou ICESCR), le Règlement sanitaire international de l’Organisation mondiale de la Santé RSI (ou IHR), le Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale et la Convention sur les armes biologiques. Des recours sont envisageables dans le cadre de chacun de ces accords par l’intermédiaire, respectivement, du Bureau du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, du directeur général de l’Organisation mondiale de la Santé – OMS (ou WHO), de la Cour pénale internationale et du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

Quelle que soit l’infraction, il est aussi toujours possible de porter une accusation devant la Cour internationale de justice – CIJ (ou ICJ) ou devant la Cour permanente d’arbitrage – CPA (ou PCA). Pour ce qui est de la Chine, on peut demander des comptes par l’intermédiaire des mécanismes de règlement des différends de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce – OMC (ou WTO). On peut aussi faire valoir sa cause dans le cadre des traités bilatéraux sur l’investissement (TBI).

On peut également demander des comptes dans le cadre des systèmes légaux du Canada et des ÉtatsUnis par les moyens suivants : poursuites contre la Chine et l’Iran devant les tribunaux nationaux, recours contre les sociétés chinoises et iraniennes en activité au Canada en vertu de la Loi sur la mise en quarantaine canadienne, imposition de sanctions économiques à la Chine et à l’Iran en vertu de la Loi sur les mesures économiques spéciales – LMES (ou SEMA) du Canada et de l’International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) des États-Unis, application de sanctions contre les hauts responsables conformément à la Loi Magnitsky ou, encore, adoption d’une nouvelle loi qui porterait précisément sur l’établissement de la responsabilité pour la COVID19.

En dernier recours, pour tenir les représentants chinois responsables de la propagation de la COVID-19, il y aurait peut-être lieu d’en appeler aux tribunaux nationaux chinois. La Chine a violé ses propres lois, de sorte que ses représentants pourraient avoir enfreint à la fois la Loi sur la santé et la quarantaine aux frontières de la République populaire de Chine et les lois pénales de ce même pays (Code pénal).

En somme, ce rapport traite des lois internationales et nationales pertinentes et évalue une variété de recours pouvant être utilisés pour demander des comptes aux régimes chinois et iranien. Ces recours pourraient être intentés séparément, ou en parallèle, en vue d’exercer une pression maximale sur ces régimes et de les tenir responsables des milliers de milliards de dollars de dommages causés par la COVID19.

Introduction

Over the past several months, the novel coronavirus and the disease caused by it (COVID-19) have taken the world by storm. The disease originated in Wuhan, the capital of the Hubei Province of the People’s Republic of China, and spread quickly to the Middle East, starting with Iran. From there, COVID-19 spread throughout Europe, with early hotspots in Italy and Spain, and throughout North America. As of July 2020, there are more than 12 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 across the globe, with over 540,000 deaths caused by the virus. Beyond the irreparable damage to human life, there are significant consequences to global economic health. In a recent report by the Henry Jackson Society, researchers found that the robust economic measures taken thus far by the G7 countries alone amount to US$4 trillion.[1]

Questions relating to legal liability are increasingly being raised. This is less about blame, and more about responsibility. It is also about compensation: Who should pay for COVID-19? China and Iran, the early hotspots, have both come under criticism for their regimes’ handling of the pandemic, with an increasing number of voices opining that these regimes should be held legally (and financially) liable for the spread of COVID-19. Although this situation is still developing, there is compelling evidence that both the Chinese and Iranian regimes buried evidence of the pandemic in its critical early days, intentionally underreporting data, concealing the extent of the outbreak from the international community and from their own citizenry, and silencing whistleblowers at the expense of protecting public health. These cover-ups had significant consequences. According to the University of Southampton, if interventions had been conducted three weeks earlier, cases could have been reduced by 95 percent – significantly reducing global spread of COVID-19.[2]

As a consensus is growing that the Chinese and Iranian regimes should be held accountable for the spread of COVID-19, it is increasingly important and relevant to analyse the legal mechanisms through which to do so. This report aims to explore these mechanisms, in a format and language accessible to both field experts and laypersons. 

Part I explains the relevant international laws that the Chinese and Iranian regimes may have breached. These are (1) the human right to health, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); (2) the World Health Organization’s (WHO) International Health Regulations (IHR); (3) international criminal law, and in particular, the crimes against humanity that are criminalized in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; and (4) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). 

A consensus is growing that the Chinese and Iranian regimes should be held accountable for the spread of COVID-19. 

Part II explains select domestic laws relating to infectious diseases and pandemic control in three countries: Canada, the United States, and China. This is to lay the groundwork for the exploration of potential avenues of recourse in domestic legal systems. 

Part III outlines the factual framework – allegations levied against the Chinese and Iranian regimes. This part focuses on allegations that the Chinese and Iranian regimes intentionally underreported critical public health data, particularly in the key early days of the outbreak, and silenced whistleblowers. 

Finally, Part IV applies the alleged facts to the laws and explores potential avenues of recourse using both international and domestic legal mechanisms. In effect, this part lays out a menu of options through which to hold China and/ or Iran accountable for the spread of COVID-19. 

Internationally, each distinct breach of international law generates specific avenues of recourse. Breaches of the ICESCR are referred to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); breaches of the IHR are referred to the WHO or the Health Assembly; breaches of the Rome Statute may be investigated at the International Criminal Court (ICC); and breaches of the Biological Weapons Convention are referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC). No matter the breach, there is also always the potential for utilizing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute resolution mechanism may also be utilized to seek accountability for COVID-19. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) may similarly be used. 

Accountability could also be sought in Canadian and US domestic legal systems. Options include: suing China or Iran in domestic courts; seeking accountability from Chinese and Iranian corporations in Canada using the Canadian Quarantine Act; imposing economic sanctions on China and Iran using the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) in Canada and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in the US; sanctioning officials under the Magnitsky Acts; and passing novel legislation to specifically address liability for COVID-19. Such novel legislation might follow the proposed Stop COVID Act currently in process in the US, or a Magnitsky-style act to specifically sanction the withholding of health information, as recently proposed by Hudson Institute. 

The final section under Part IV outlines the potential to hold Chinese officials liable for the spread of COVID-19 from within the domestic Chinese legal system. Chinese actions constitute a breach of China’s own laws, and Chinese officials may be in breach of both the Frontier Health and Quarantine Law of the People’s Republic of China (China’s Quarantine Act) and the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (China’s Criminal Code). The same model may be available with respect to Iranian laws, but a consult with an Iranian lawyer is required to assess this option. 

In sum, this report expounds on relevant international and domestic laws and evaluates a variety of avenues of recourse that may be utilized to seek accountability from the Chinese and Iranian regimes. These may be pursued separately, or in tandem, to pressure the Chinese and Iranian regimes and work to hold them liable for the trillions of dollars of damages caused by COVID-19. 


[1] 1 Matthew Henderson et al., “Coronavirus Compensation? Assessing China’s Potential Culpability and Avenues of Legal Response,” Henry Jackson Society, April 5, 2020, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Coronavirus-Compensation.pdf.

[2] Shengjie Lai et al., “Effect of Non-pharmaceutical Interventions for Containing the COVID-19 Outbreak in China,” MedRxiv (13 March 2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/ content/10.1101/2020.03.03.20029843v3.full.pdf.

Key Points 

The allegations levied against the Chinese and Iranian regimes are serious. Withholding critical public health information, silencing whistleblowers, delaying containment measures, and sacrificing the health and safety of their citizenry in favour of maintaining power and/or stability – all this is in violation of numerous international and domestic legal obligations. These actions had significant consequences worldwide. There are more than a dozen legal avenues through which our governments (and in some cases, our citizens) can seek accountability from China and Iran for the global spread of COVID-19. These are condensed into 12 key points to take away from the analysis: 

1. The Chinese and Iranian regimes likely breached their international legal obligations pursuant to Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which protects and guarantees the human right to health. These breaches may be referred to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and, in particular, the special rapporteurs. These breaches may also be brought to the UN Human Rights Council, another human rights body supported by the OHCHR. 

2. The Chinese and Iranian regimes likely breached Articles 6, 7, and 44 of the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations  (IHR). These articles require states parties to notify the WHO promptly, and collaborate with other countries. The Chinese regime may have further breached Article 46. States parties may refer IHR disputes to the director-general of the WHO. A complaint against the WHO itself may be referred to the World Health Assembly. 

3. The Chinese and Iranian regimes’ withholding of critical health information may fit the definition of a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The allegations appear to fit many of the required elements for three specific crimes against humanity offences: the crime against humanity of murder, the crime against humanity of extermination, and the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. It may be worthwhile for the International Criminal Court to open a preliminary examination into the situation. 

4. The Chinese and Iranian regimes may have breached the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. A state party may lodge a complaint regarding an alleged breach with the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council may then launch an investigation. Canada or the United States could lodge such a complaint with the UN Security Council, although China’s veto vote may in effect block this as an option. 

Canada could also seek recourse from China for any breaches of the China-Canada bilateral investment treaty. 

5. Canada or the United States may request that the case be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In the likely event that neither China nor Iran provides its consent to utilizing the ICJ or the PCA, Canada or the United States may request that the case be referred to the ICJ for an advisory opinion, which does not require their consent. 

6. The Chinese regime’s actions may be framed as trade-related, in breach of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. Iran is not a WTO member state, and so this mechanism cannot be used to hold the Iranian regime to account. There are a couple of ways in which COVID-19 can be framed as trade-related, and these are discussed in the main body of this report. 

7. Canada could also seek recourse from China for any breaches of the China-Canada bilateral investment treaty (BIT). If China is alleged to be in breach of any of the provisions contained in the BIT, and the dispute cannot be settled through diplomatic channels within six months, Canada can request that the dispute be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. The involvement of the tribunal at that point is compulsory. 

8. Parties in Canada or the United States may sue China or Iran in Canadian and/or US domestic courts. If such a case proceeds, domestic courts can investigate the origin of the virus, make findings of fact, and assess Chinese and Iranian legal culpability. Such courts can ultimately rule that China and/or Iran must compensate victims, and if these foreign states do not pay as required, their assets may be seized, sold, and the proceeds distributed to victims. The primary hurdle to these lawsuits will be to argue that these foreign states are not protected by sovereign immunity (the general principle that foreign states should not be subject to domestic jurisdiction). There are a number of exceptions to sovereign immunity, contained in the Canadian State Immunity Act and the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Besides the terrorism exception as it is articulated in the Canadian State Immunity Act, none of the existing exceptions are likely to apply. To enable such domestic lawsuits, Canada and/or the United States can pass a bill adding a new, targeted exception to sovereign immunity. Such a bill is already in process in the US (e.g., the Stop COVID Act). 

9. Chinese and Iranian corporations in Canada may be held accountable under the Quarantine Act. The Canadian Quarantine Act proscribes (1) hindering or wilfully obstructing a quarantine officer, (2) violations that cause “a risk of imminent death or serious bodily harm to another person,” and (3) failure on the part of directors and officers to “take all reasonable care to ensure that the corporation complies with this Act and the regulations.” If a Chinese or Iranian corporation in Canada played a role in concealing the extent of the COVID-19 outbreak, this may conceivably be a breach of these obligations. Upon conviction, this can result in a hefty fine and an order for compensation. If the company does not pay, costs may be recovered in court by the seizure of assets. 

10. Canadian and US governments may impose economic sanctions on China and Iran. The power to impose economic sanctions is contained in Canada in the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) and in the US in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). 

11. Canadian and US governments may impose sanctions on responsible Chinese and Iranian officials pursuant to their Magnitsky Acts (virtually identical in both countries). If Chinese and Iranian officials are sanctioned pursuant to these acts, they may be subject to property-blocking sanctions and travel restrictions. In addition, Canadian and US governments may pass novel legislation to sanction foreign officials who intentionally conceal or distort critical public health information. 

12. In addition to pursuing accountability in Canadian and US domestic courts, a domestic suit may be pursued within the Chinese legal system. Domestic levels of corruption within China may, in effect, preclude this possibility, but it is significant to appreciate that even pursuant to China’s own domestic legislation, distorting public health data, silencing whistleblowers, and generally de-prioritizing public health are against the law. A variety of domestic Chinese provisions appear to have been breached; for example, Article 409 of the Chinese Criminal Code criminalizes “government work personnel … engaging in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases, whose serious irresponsibility has resulted in the communication and spread of infectious diseases.”